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This paper examines the impact of option trading on individual investor performance. The results show
that most investors incur substantial losses on their option investments, which are much larger than the
losses from equity trading. We attribute the detrimental impact of option trading on investor perfor-
mance to poor market timing that results from overreaction to past stock market returns. High trading
costs further contribute to the poor returns on option investments. Gambling and entertainment appear
to be the most important motivations for trading options while hedging motives only play a minor role.
We also provide strong evidence of performance persistence among option traders.
 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Over the last decade, Internet brokerage has dramatically chan-
ged the investment landscape. The professional traders who used
to dominate ﬁnancial markets now ﬁnd themselves surrounded
by a much larger and more divergent crowd: individual investors.
To gain a better insight into the trading behavior of the increasing
numbers of individual investors, ﬁnancial economists examine
their performance using trading records and position statements
obtained from brokerage ﬁrms.
1
A growing literature presents evidence of irrational behavior of
individual investors in option markets. Poteshman (2001) shows
that option market investors exhibit the same pattern of short-
term underreaction and long-term overreaction to information
that has been found in stock markets. In addition, Poteshman
andSerbin (2003) ﬁnd that customers of discount brokers regularly
engage in irrational early exercise of stock options and Mahani and
Poteshman (2008) document that discount clients act irrationally
by entering option positions that load up on growth stocks a few
days before earnings announcements, even though at earnings
announcements value stocks usually outperform substantially.
Moreover, Han (2008) ﬁnds that investor sentiment about the
stock market affects option prices. Another strand of literature
stresses the importance of irrational determinants of individual
investors’ trading activity in stock markets, like gambling (Kumar,
2008), entertainment (Dorn and Sengmueller, 2007), and sensa-
tion-seeking (Grinblatt and Keloharju, in press). However, options
seem to be more attractive for these purposes than stocks due to
the leverage they provide and the positive skewness of their
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journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbfpayoffs. Indeed, Lakonishok et al. (2007) show that a large fraction
of individuals’ option activity is motivated by speculation on the
direction of future stock price movements.
We extend this work by studying the impact of option trading
on individual investor performance. Doing so gives us the opportu-
nity to shed light on the question whether individual investors
understand the risk and return characteristics of these more com-
plex securities, and whether they are able to use these instruments
successfully. Previous work (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2000) has
shown that excessive trading by individual investors leads to sub-
stantial losses on their common stock investments. We therefore
examine both the absolute returns of option traders and their per-
formance relative to those who only trade stocks. In addition, we
identify the determinants of option trading volume at the investor
level to examine whether option trading is related to investor
characteristics that have been linked to gambling and sensation-
seeking in stock markets by Kumar (2008) and Grinblatt and Kel-
oharju (in press). Furthermore, we investigate whether there is a
group of option traders who are able to consistently earn abnormal
returns. This is motivated by the ﬁndings of Coval et al. (2005),
who present evidence of performance persistence among a small
group of stock investors. We then analyze the characteristics and
trading strategies of these skilled option investors.
We perform the empirical analysis using a unique database that
comprises more than 68,000 accounts and more than eight million
trades in stocks and options at a large online broker in the Nether-
lands. In terms of size, the sample is comparable to the data set of-
ten used in studies for the United States (see, e.g., Barber and
Odean, 2000; Kumar, 2008). We examine investor behavior and
performance from January 2000 to March 2006, which covers the
top of the stock market boom in 2000, the subsequent bust in stock
prices in 2001 and 2002, and the recovery from 2003 to 2006. Thus,
we are able to examine whether major market movements affect
trading behavior and investor performance.
We use several methods to deal with the speciﬁc risk and return
characteristics of individual investor portfolios. First, to adjust re-
turns for risk and style tilts, we use a multifactor model in the spir-
it of Agarwal and Naik (2004) to capture the nonlinear payoffs of
options. Furthermore, we use a Kalman ﬁlter approach to allow
for time variation in risk loadings and style preferences. Finally,
we introduce an approach that allows us to control for risk and
style exposures even when the number of time series observations
for some investors is very small.
We ﬁnd that option traders incur much larger losses on their
investments than equity traders. The gross return difference be-
tween these two groups of investors equals more than 1% a month,
after taking risk and style differences into account. Controlling for
known determinants of investor returns like gender, age, turnover,
account value, income, and experience does not explain the return
differential between option investors and equity investors. Instead,
we attribute the poor performance of option traders to bad market
timing that results from overreaction to past stock market move-
ments. We construct a call/put ratio based on the option trades
of the clients of the broker and ﬁnd this ratio to be highly corre-
lated with two other sentiment indicators, the consumer conﬁ-
dence index and the VIX index. In addition, estimation results for
a vector autoregressive model show that the call/put ratio is driven
by past market returns.
We further document that the demographic (age and gender),
socioeconomic (income) and portfolio characteristics (account va-
lue and turnover) of option traders and equity traders are very sim-
ilar. In particular, the empirical results show that men are more
likely than women to engage in both option trading and equity
trading and also exhibit a higher trading intensity. Furthermore,
we extend the result of Anderson (2006) that poorer investors
trade most to the option market. However, an important difference
between option traders and equity traders is the impact of past
portfolio returns. Speciﬁcally, while past returns do not affect an
individual’s trading activity in stock markets, they have a signiﬁ-
cantly negative inﬂuence on option trading volume. This is related
to the ﬁnding of Coval and Shumway (2005) that futures traders
are highly loss-averse and take more risk following losses than fol-
lowing gains.
We link the option positions that investors take to their com-
mon stock holdings and show that most investors do not use op-
tions for hedging underlying stock positions, which conﬁrms the
results of Lakonishok et al. (2007) for the US market. Instead, our
ﬁnding that single men with low income and little investment
experience trade most suggests that gambling and sensation-seek-
ing are important determinants of option trading, consistent with
the results of Kumar (2008) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (in press)
for equity investors. This is conﬁrmed by the responses of a group
of brokerage clients to several statements on investment attitude,
which reveal that the majority of investors enjoy trading and only
invest the money they do not directly need. The responses also
show that only a small subset of investors uses the option Greeks
when trading options. Hence, a lack of knowledge about the risk
and return characteristics and the use of options might be another
explanation for the detrimental impact of option trading on inves-
tor performance. Seru etal. (2008) provide support for this hypoth-
esis by showing that inexperienced investors learn slowly.
Consistent with this interpretation, we identify a small group of
sophisticated option traders who succeed in consistently outper-
forming other investors. Speciﬁcally, option traders who are in
the top decile portfolio based on past 1-year performance continue
to outperform investors in the bottom decile over the next year in
terms of both gross and net alphas. Performance persistence is
somewhat weaker on shorter horizons but still signiﬁcant for 6-
month periods. Persistence in trading costs explains only part of
total performance persistence, as we also ﬁnd persistence in gross
performance. Analyzing the composition of the decile portfolios
shows that investors in the bottom deciles tend to hold small ac-
counts with high turnover. Furthermore, these accounts are pre-
dominantly held by men with low income and little investment
experience.
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we give a short
overview of individual investors and ﬁnancial markets in the Neth-
erlands and introduce the data set of investor accounts and trades
that is used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 outlines the meth-
ods used for performance calculation and attribution and Section 4
presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data
2.1. Individual investors and ﬁnancial markets in the Netherlands
We use a data set of individual investor accounts at a large on-
line discount broker in the Netherlands. At the end of 2006, 224
companies had listed their shares at Euronext Amsterdam, of
which 128 were domestic ﬁrms and 96 were foreign.
2 The total
market capitalization of these companies was 591 billion euros. To-
tal equity turnover in 2006 was close to 687 billion euros of which
585 billion euros was turnover of stocks included in the AEX index.
The Dutch AEX stock market index is a value-weighted index of the
25 most actively traded ﬁrms with a combined market value of 50
billion euros. On the Euronext Liffe Amsterdam exchange options
on approximately 50 different stocks are traded. In 2006 a total of
2 These statistics are retrieved from the Euronext Global factbook, available at
http://www.euronext.com.
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tracts were traded.
An annual survey performed by the marketing research agency
Millward-Brown in 2006 among approximately 1000 Dutch inves-
tors characterizes the market of individual investors in the Nether-
lands. In total 1.5 million out of 7 million Dutch households invest
their money in ﬁnancial markets. The average Dutch retail investor
trades securities at 1.4 different ﬁnancial institutions (banks and
online brokers). Thus, it is unlikely that the investors in our sample
trade at many other institutions than the online broker. Almost
half of Dutch retail investors trade through websites of banks
and Internet brokers. These online investors trade almost three
times as much as ofﬂine investors, in line with results documented
by Barber and Odean (2002). The value-weighted asset mix of the
average Dutch investor consists of 44% mutual funds, 34% stocks,
15% bonds, 5% derivatives and 2% other products. Investors indi-
cate that they predominantly invest in mutual funds via a tradi-
tional bank. In contrast, online brokers are mostly used for
trading stocks and derivatives. For the average (median) investor
the total value of the investment portfolio is €60,000 (€35,000).
2.2. Data set
The raw data set contains the daily trades and end-of-the-
month portfolio positions of all individual investor accounts that
existed during the period from January 2000 to March 2006. Due
to trading restrictions, we exclude accounts owned by minors
(age <18 years). We further exclude accounts with a beginning-
of-the-month value of less than €250 to reduce the impact of out-
liers. Imposing these restrictions leaves 68,146 accounts and more
than two million monthly portfolio overviews. On average, inves-
tors are present in the sample for 36 months.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the data set. The sample
is split into 26,266 option traders and 41,880 equity traders. We
deﬁne an option trader as an investor who trades options at least
once during the sample period. The proportion of men among
option investors and equity investors is similar (more than 75%).
Thus, if we take gender as a proxy for overconﬁdence, as suggested
by Barber and Odean (2001), option traders and equity traders ex-
hibit the same level of overconﬁdence. The average age of option
traders and equity investors is also very similar (45 years). For op-
tion investors the mean (median) number of trades during the
sample period is 80 (16) and for those who only invest in stocks
the average (median) number of trades is 45 (11). The 10 most
traded stocks account for 34% of all stock transactions and almost
half of the value of all stock trades. The four most frequently traded
stocks all belong to the IT and Telecommunications sector, which
reﬂects the heavy trading of these stocks during the tech bubble.
Most other frequently traded stocks are those of large companies.
3
A striking feature of our sample is that almost half of all trades are in
options.
4 More than 33 million option contracts are traded, which,
based on historical statistics retrieved from NYSE Euronext Liffe, is
7.2% of all option contracts traded at the Amsterdam options ex-
change during the sample period. The 10 most traded underlyings
account for 77.2% of all option trades and 72.0% of the value of all op-
tion trades. Options on the Dutch AEX index account for 47.8% of all
option transactions and 34.3% of the value of all option trades. The
most frequently traded stock options are those on the largest ﬁrms
with the most liquid stocks.
5
Table 1 also reports statistics for monthly turnover per account,
which we deﬁne as the average of the value of all security
purchases and sales divided by beginning-of-the-month account
Table 1
Descriptive statistics on investor accounts and trades.
Mean Std. dev. 5th 25th Median 75th 95th




Option traders 45.28 12.98 26 36 44 55 67
Equity traders 44.72 13.29 25 36 44 54 66
Trades (#)
Option traders 80.32 304.23 1 4 16 59 331
Equity traders 45.26 135.43 1 4 11 35 185
Turnover (%)
Option traders 8.85 100.83 0 0 0 0 25.60
Equity traders 23.68 184.96 0 0 0 2.38 83.33
Portfolio value (€)
Option traders 34,682 111,344 500 2700 9419 29,432 133,655
Equity traders 35,053 179,762 662 3343 10,004 28,351 129,812
Income (€)
Option traders 2548 935 1500 1900 2300 2900 4300
Equity traders 2563 937 1500 2000 2400 2900 4400
Experience (months)
Option traders 34.64 28.02 3.00 12.00 27.28 50.80 75.00
Equity traders 32.94 25.34 2.00 12.00 27.52 48.80 74.00
This table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of 68,146 investor accounts at a Dutch online broker. We split the sample into 26,266 option traders and 41,880 equity
traders. The sample period is from January 2000 to March 2006. The variables are deﬁned as follows: Gender and Age are the gender and age of the primary account holder.
Trades is the total number of trades per account during the sample period. Turnover is the average of the value of all purchases and sales in a given month divided by the
beginning-of-the-month account value. Portfolio value is the average market value of all assets in the investor’s portfolio. Income is the average monthly income assigned to
investors based on their zip-code. Experience is the number of months an investor has been trading. The table shows for each variable the mean, median, and standard
deviation, as well as 5th, 25th, 75th, and 95th percentile values.
3 By constructing value-weighted factors for performance attribution we take into
account that investors mainly hold large caps, since these stocks receive more weight
in the construction of the factors.
4 To make a clean comparison between the impact of option trading and equity
trading on investor performance we disregard transactions in bonds and futures
contracts, which constitute only a small fraction of all trades.
5 The option-based factors that we include in the performance evaluation model
are constructed using AEX index options. Large and liquid stocks receive more weight
in the value-weighted AEX index. Therefore, the fact that options are not available for
small and illiquid stocks does not affect the performance evaluation.
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over is zero. For equity traders the average (median) turnover is
23.7% (zero). These results show that although the majority of
investors (65%) does not trade on a monthly basis, a subset of
investors trades very often. The fact that for option investors the
average number of trades is higher than for equity investors but
the average turnover is lower, indicates that the value of each
option transaction is smaller than the value of a stock transaction.
Consequently, the average costs per transaction are higher for
option traders than for equity traders (€32 and €22, respectively).
The average (median) portfolio size of option traders and
equity traders is again close to each other, with a mean value
of €35,000 and a median of €10,000. Combining the average ac-
count value with a total portfolio value of €60,000 for the aver-
age Dutch investor, as reported by Millward-Brown (2006),
shows that the average client invests more than half of the total
investment portfolio at the online broker. We also assign income
to investors, based on their zip-code and income data retrieved
from the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). The average
gross income of both groups of traders is slightly higher than
€2500 a month. Following Seru et al. (2008), we measure experi-
ence by the number of months that an investor has been trading.
The results in Table 1 show that on average, option traders are a
bit more experienced than equity traders (35 and 33 months of
experience, respectively). In general, however, the descriptive
statistics show a striking similarity between the demographic,
socioeconomic, and portfolio characteristics of option traders
and equity traders.
3. Methods
3.1. Measuring investor performance
We deﬁne investor performance as the monthly change in the
market value of all stocks and options in an investor’s account.
End-of-the-month account value is net of transaction costs the
investor incurred during the month. Since we measure perfor-
mance on a monthly basis, we have to make an assumption con-
cerning the timing of deposits and withdrawals of cash and
securities. To be conservative, we assume that deposits are made
at the beginning of the month and that withdrawals take place at
the end of the month. We also performed the analysis under the
assumption that deposits and withdrawals are made halfway the
month and ﬁnd that our results are robust to this assumption.




ðVit   Vit 1   NDWitÞ
ðVit 1 þ DitÞ
; ð1Þ
where Vit is the account value at the end of month t, NDWit is the net
of deposits and withdrawals during month t, and Dit are the depos-
its made during month t.
We obtain gross returns by adding back transaction costs in-




ðVit   Vit 1   NDWit þ TCitÞ
ðVit 1 þ DitÞ
: ð2Þ
We only consider direct transaction costs (commissions) and do
not add back any indirect transaction costs (market impact and
bid-ask spreads). The trades of most individual investors are rela-
tively small, so their market impact is likely to be limited. In addi-
tion, Keim and Madhavan (1998) point out that quoted bid-ask
spreads may be imprecise estimates of the true spread, because
trades are often executed inside the quoted spread. Therefore, Bar-
ber and Odean (2000) estimate the bid-ask spread using transac-
tion prices and closing prices. However, this approach is
inappropriate for our purposes as the resulting estimate of the
spread includes the return on the trading day, which can be sub-
stantial in the case of options.
3.2. Performance attribution
We attribute the returns on investor portfolios to different risk
and style factors to obtain the abnormal performance. The Carhart
(1997) four-factor model is used to adjust investor returns for
exposures to the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum
factors. We construct these factors for the Dutch market, since
the investors in the sample mainly invest in Dutch securities.
6 To
characterize the market risk of the equity component of the portfolio
returns, we include the return on the MSCI Netherlands equity index.
We construct the factor-mimicking portfolios SMB, HML, and MOM
according to the procedure outlined by Kenneth French.
7
To characterize the nonlinear exposure from options, we build
on the theoretical framework developed by Glosten and Jaganna-
than (1994), who propose adding option-based factors to perfor-
mance attribution models. Agarwal and Naik (2004) implement
this approach to measure the risk exposure of hedge funds and ﬁnd
that many funds use strategies that result in option-like payoffs.
Following these studies, we include the excess returns on liquid
at-the-money (ATM) European call and put options on the Dutch
AEX stock market index to capture the nonlinear systematic risk
exposure of investors’ portfolios. In particular, at the end of each
month, ATM call and put index options that expire 2 months later
are bought. These index options are sold 1 month later and new in-
dex options are purchased. As a proxy for ATM options we select
options whose strike prices are closest to the current index value.
This rolling strategy of buying and selling index calls and puts pro-
duces a time series of monthly returns on ATM calls and puts that
we add to the performance attribution model.
We further include the value-weighted average return on Dutch
stocks from the MSCI IT and Telecommunications sector to capture
possible tech-related style tilts, since many economists, including
Shiller (2005), argue that the technology bubble was fed by irratio-
nal euphoria among individual investors. Because the option-based
factors and the IT factor are highly correlated with the market re-
turn, we orthogonalize them with respect to the market factor.
The general time series model we estimate to obtain risk- and
style-adjusted returns is
Rit ¼ ai þ
X K
k¼1
bikFkt þ it; ð3Þ
where Rit is the excess return on the portfolio of investor i, bik is the
loading of portfolio i on factor k, and Fkt is the month t excess return
on the k’th factor-mimicking portfolio. The intercept ai measures
abnormal performance relative to the risk and style factors. The fac-
tor loadings indicate whether a portfolio is tilted towards a partic-
ular investment style.
Other studies on individual investor performance assume that
factor loadings remain constant over time, i.e., they use uncondi-
tional or static models for performance attribution. However, a
large body of empirical evidence shows that the systematic risk
of stocks varies substantially over time as a function of the busi-
ness cycle (see, e.g., Ferson and Harvey,1999; Bauer et al., in press).
Moreover, in a dynamic world it is unlikely that investors keep
6 In terms of volume (value) 95% (85%) of all trades are transactions in Dutch
securities. This suggests the presence of a home bias among Dutch investors, which
has previously been documented by French and Poterba (1991) for the US, Japan, and
UK and by Karlsson and Norden (2007) for Sweden. Consequently, we ﬁnd that Dutch
versions of the factor-mimicking portfolios lead to a better model ﬁt than do
international factors.
7 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
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ical support for this conjecture is provided by Kumar (in press),
who ﬁnds that individual investors exhibit time-varying style pref-
erences, driven by past style returns and earnings differentials.
Hence, Ferson and Schadt (1996) argue that ﬂuctuations in factor
exposures should be taken into account when measuring portfolio
performance. We treat the time-varying alphas and betas as latent
state variables and infer them directly from portfolio returns using
the Kalman ﬁlter. We assume a random walk process for the latent
alphas and betas. Speciﬁcally, we consider the following state-
space representation:
Rit ¼ ait þ
X K
k¼1
biktFkt þ it;  it   Nð0;r
2
i Þ; ð4Þ
ait ¼ ait 1 þmit; mit   Nð0;r
2
imÞ; ð5Þ
bit ¼ bit 1 þgit; git   Nð0;QÞ; ð6Þ
where  it, mit, and git are normally distributed mean zero shocks
orthogonal to each other and with variance r2
i , r2
im, and diagonal
covariance matrix Q, respectively. We test the null hypothesis of
constant betas, which corresponds to the restriction that the diag-
onal elements of Q are zero, using a likelihood ratio test. Eq. (4) is
the observation equation and Eqs. (5) and (6) are the state
equations. The Kalman ﬁlter is a recursive algorithm for sequen-
tially updating the one-step ahead estimate of the state mean
and variance. We use it to calculate maximum likelihood estimates
of the model parameters r2
i , r2
im, and Q along with minimum mean-
square error estimates of the state variables ait and bit. We set the
initial one-step-ahead predicted values for the states equal to the
OLS estimates from the static model. We treat the initial one-
step-ahead predicted values of r2
im and the covariance matrix Q as
diffuse, setting them equal to arbitrarily large numbers. We use a
smoothing algorithm to obtain Kalman smoothed estimates, condi-
tioned on information from the full sample period (see, e.g., Ham-
ilton, 1994).
4. Results
4.1. Option trading and investor performance
In this section we compare the raw returns and alphas of option
traders and equity investors. Barber and Odean (2000) show that
the common stock performance of individual investors is poor
due to excessive trading and poor stock selection skills. This raises
the question how these investors perform when trading options,
which have a more complex payoff structure.
In Table 2, panel A shows that the average option investor loses
1.81% per month in gross terms during the sample period, which is
Table 2
Investment performance of option traders and equity traders.
Gross Net
Options Stocks Difference Options Stocks Difference
Panel A: Performance full period: 2000/01–2006/03
Raw return  1.81  0.58  1.23  4.46  1.57  2.89
( 2.31) ( 0.49) ( 1.60) ( 6.83) ( 1.35) ( 3.24)
Static alpha  1.01 0.03  1.04  3.72  0.97  2.75
( 1.72) (0.05) ( 2.00) ( 6.30) ( 2.08) ( 4.65)
Dynamic alpha  0.93 0.03  0.96  3.59  0.97  2.62
( 1.75) (0.34) ( 2.08) ( 6.24) ( 2.17) ( 4.81)
Panel B: Performance subperiod 1: 2000/01–2003/03
Raw return  3.03  3.70 0.67  5.51  4.78  0.73
( 3.02) ( 2.52) (0.68) ( 5.60) ( 3.32) ( 0.78)
Static alpha 1.32 1.00 0.32  1.28  0.15  1.13
(1.17) (1.23) (0.39) ( 1.19) ( 0.10) ( 1.43)
Panel C: Performance subperiod 2: 2003/04–2006/03
Raw return  0.48 2.80  3.28  3.33 1.90  5.23
( 0.58) (2.02) ( 2.65) ( 4.48) (1.41) ( 4.45)
Static alpha  1.82  0.01  1.81  4.74  0.87  3.87
( 2.92) ( 0.01) ( 2.15) ( 7.87) ( 1.29) ( 4.90)
Full period Subperiod 1 Subperiod 2
Options Stocks Options Stocks Options Stocks
Panel D: Factor loadings
RM 0.94 1.48 1.20 1.46 0.71 1.14
(5.55) (19.39) (4.69) (10.48) (2.52) (3.70)
SMB 0.30 0.99 0.22 0.87 0.60 1.05
(1.21) (7.89) (0.74) (6.87) (2.01) (3.18)
HML  0.13 0.23  0.10 0.26 0.10 0.42
( 0.63) (2.31) ( 0.39) (2.99) (0.41) (1.62)
MOM 0.16 0.01 0.21 0.15 0.16  0.36
(1.26) (0.08) (1.12) (2.17) (1.16) ( 2.65)
ATMC 0.37 0.06 0.66  0.12 0.39 0.22
(3.24) (0.80) (2.18) ( 0.59) (2.58) (1.79)
ATMP 0.04  0.02 0.08 0.05  0.15  0.21
(0.24) ( 0.26) (0.44) (0.53) ( 1.08) ( 1.15)
IT 0.31 0.41 0.25 0.48 0.17 0.24
(2.89) (6.35) (1.44) (5.46) (0.99) (1.28)
Adj. R
2 (%) 61.8 89.1 61.3 94.2 62.8 85.3
This table reports the raw returns and alphas of option traders and equity investors. Panel A presents the performance for the full sample period, January 2000 to March 2006,
panel B for the ﬁrst subperiod from January 2000 to March 2003, and panel C for the second subperiod from April 2003 to March 2006. The left-hand side of each panel shows
the gross performance and the right-hand side displays the net performance of each group of investors. Static alphas are those produced by the static model in Eq. (3) and
dynamic alphas are the average alphas produced by the dynamic model in Eqs. (4)–(6). Panel D reports the estimated factor loadings in the static model for the full period and
the two subperiods for both groups of investors. t-Statistics based on Newey–West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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contrast, equity investors only lose 0.58%, which is not signiﬁcant
at conventional levels. The second line in Table 2 shows that
accounting for risk exposures and style tilts explains only part of
the poor performance of option traders. Speciﬁcally, while the
gross alpha of equity traders is close to zero, the risk- and style-ad-
justed return of option traders is  1.01%. In the third row of panel
A, we adjust returns for time-varying risk and style exposures
using the dynamic factor model in Eqs. (4)–(6). Although the aver-
age dynamic alpha of option traders is 10 basis points higher than
their static alpha, they still underperform equity investors by al-
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Fig. 1. Kalman smoothed alpha and betas for option traders. This ﬁgure plots the evolution of the Kalman smoothed alpha and betas for option traders over the period January
2000 through March 2006. The estimates are produced by the dynamic factor model in Eqs. (4)–(6) and are based on gross returns.
736 R. Bauer et al./Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (2009) 731–746and investment styles does not eliminate the underperformance of
option traders.
The right-hand side of panel A indicates that the performance
gap between option traders and common stock investors widens
when transaction costs are taken into account. In particular, the
net alphas of equity investors are 2.75% higher than those of option
traders. Thus, option investors not only lose due to poor invest-
ment decisions but also suffer from higher trading costs. Part of
this underperformance can be explained by the brokerage ﬁrm’s
commission fee structure. Trading costs for option contracts con-
sist of a speciﬁc amount per contract, whereas trading costs for
stocks are based on a ﬁxed amount and a variable part that de-
pends on the value of the transaction. Because option investors
tend to trade many small contracts, trading options is more expen-
sive than trading stocks in relative terms.
To shed more light on the poor performance of option traders
we split the sample in two subperiods.
8 The ﬁrst period, from Jan-
uary 2000 to March 2003, includes the huge stock market decline
after the burst of the tech bubble. In the second subperiod, from
April 2003 to March 2006, the market gradually recovers from the
crash. Panel B shows that in the ﬁrst subperiod option investors earn
positive gross alphas and actually outperform equity traders. How-
ever, panel C reveals that in the second subperiod option traders
underperform other investors by almost two percent in terms of
gross alpha and almost four percent in terms of net alpha. These re-
sults suggest that option traders seem to miss the recovery of the
market.
Panel D reports the beta estimates in the static performance
evaluation model for both groups of investors. These betas are
basedongrossreturnsbutloadingsbasedonnetreturnsaresimilar.
The results indicate that the loadings of the portfolios held by op-
tion investors on the marketand SMBfactors are signiﬁcantly lower
thanthose oftheequity-onlytraders.Asexpected,theirexposureto
the call option factor is higher. The positive loadings on the IT factor
imply that, on average, investors’ portfolios are tilted towards tech-
nology stocks. The subsample analysis shows that investors lower
their exposure to the market, momentum and the IT factors but in-
creasetheirexposuretothesizeandvaluefactorsinthesecondsub-
period, in line with Kumar’s (in press) ﬁnding that individual
investors exhibit time-varying style preferences.
Fig. 1, which traces the evolution of time-varying alphas and be-
tas for option traders, conﬁrms our ﬁnding that these investors pri-
marily underperform in the second subperiod. The plot further
shows that although factor betas ﬂuctuate heavily, investors often
adjust their exposures too late.
9 For instance, in the ﬁrst subperiod
option traders increase their exposure to the call option factor when
the market falls, but decrease their call option exposure at the begin-
ning of the second subperiod when the recovery sets in. Interesting,
however, is that option traders already lower their exposure to the IT
factor in 2000 whereas equity traders keep their exposure constant
throughout the ﬁrst subperiod. A possible explanation for the slower
response of equity investors to the burst of the IT bubble is that these
traders are more prone to the disposition effect than option traders.
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) show that hedge funds, which are
considered to be managed by sophisticated investors, were also rid-
ing the bubble but reduced their exposure to the IT sector before
stock prices collapsed.
Because the poor performance of option traders compared to
equity investors is not explained by risk and style tilts, we consider
several other potential explanations. First, we account for known
determinants of investor performance by relating returns to a
number of investor characteristics. We examine the cross-sectional
relation between investor performance and characteristics using
the cross-sectional approach of Fama and MacBeth (1973). Each
month we run a cross-sectional regression of portfolio returns on
investor characteristics,
Rit ¼ c0t þ
X L
l¼1
cltZilt þ nit; ð7Þ
where Zilt is the value of characteristic l for investor i in month t.W e
then calculate the Fama–MacBeth estimator for the characteristics,
which is the time series average of the monthly cross-sectional
parameter estimates. We calculate the standard error of the
Fama–MacBeth estimator from the time series of these monthly
estimates. We perform this analysis for the full sample period as
well as the two subperiods deﬁned before to assess the stability
of the relations between performance and characteristics in differ-
ent market conditions.
We include the following characteristics as independent vari-
ables: options and stocks&options, which are two dummy variables
equal to one if investor i trades only options or both stocks and op-
tions, respectively, in month t; monthly portfolio turnover; inactive,
a dummy variable equal to one if monthly portfolio turnover is
zero; and woman and joint, which are two gender dummy variables
equal to one if the account is held by a woman or jointly by a man
and woman. We also include the value of the portfolio at the end of
the previous month. Because the descriptive statistics in Table 1
show that the distributions of turnover and account value are
skewed, we trim these characteristics at the 99th percentile and
use their logarithmic transformations. We further include the age
and the gross income of investors. Finally, we add experience, mea-
sured by the number of months an investor has been trading, to the
regressions.
Table 3 reports results from the Fama–MacBeth regressions.
Results on the left-hand side of the table correspond to regres-
sions with raw returns as dependent variable. The ﬁrst column
shows that even after controlling for investor and portfolio char-
acteristics, option traders continue to earn lower gross returns
than those investors who only trade stocks. This is consistent
with the observation in Table 1 that the demographic, socioeco-
nomic, and portfolio characteristics of option traders and equity
investors are very similar. The estimation results for the two sub-
periods reported in columns two and three conﬁrm the result
from Table 2 that the underperformance of option traders is con-
centrated in the second subperiod. The estimates in the next
three columns show that also in the presence of control variables
the return difference between option and stock investors in-
creases when transactions costs are taken into account. In addi-
tion, the coefﬁcient estimates on the control variables have the
expected signs. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that trading lowers net per-
formance, in line with the evidence of Barber and Odean
(2000), and that portfolios held by women outperform those of
men, conﬁrming the results of Barber and Odean (2001). We also
ﬁnd a strong, positive relation between portfolio value and inves-
tor performance and between income and performance, which
indicates that investors with larger portfolios and higher income
outperform smaller investors.
The cross-sectional analysis above does not account for risk and
style differences across investor portfolios. The standard approach
to identifying the determinants of cross-sectional variation in risk-
and style-adjusted returns consists of two steps. First, for every
portfolio a time series regression of returns on risk and style factors
is run to obtain alpha. Second, a cross-sectional regression of these
alphas on investor characteristics is estimated. The main drawback
of this approach is the errors-in-variables problem that arises be-
8 We do not estimate dynamic models for subperiods because of the small number
of time series observations.
9 The likelihood ratio for testing whether factor loadings are constant in the
dynamic model is 22.11, rejecting the null hypothesis that betas are constant at a 1%
level.
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are estimated with error. Therefore, we introduce a new method
that makes it possible to control for risk and style exposures even
when the number of return observations for some investors is
small. This approach is based on a purged estimator used in the as-
set pricing literature by Brennan et al. (1998). Each month, we run
the cross-sectional regression (7) of returns on characteristics.
We then regress the vector of monthly cross-sectional coefﬁcients
for each characteristic, clt, on a constant and the risk and style fac-
tors Fkt,




In the Appendix we demonstrate that the intercept in this
regression, dl0, is an unbiased estimate of the cross-sectional rela-
tion between characteristic l and alpha.
The right-hand side of Table 3 shows that the conclusion that
option trading has a detrimental impact on investor performance
also holds when alpha is used as a dependent variable. The bottom
line is that controlling for differences in risk and style exposures
and differences in the characteristics of investors and their portfo-
lios does not explain the underperformance of option traders com-
pared to equity investors.
4.2. Investor sentiment and market timing
The ﬁnding that the underperformance of option investors is
concentrated in the second subperiod suggests that it is related
to poor market timing. Market timing skills are especially impor-
tant in the option market because options are effective instru-
ments for betting on market moves due to the leverage they
provide and the positive skewness of their payoffs. Since we ﬁnd
that option investors perform poorly when markets move upward,
we conjecture that after the stock market decline in 2001 and
2002, investors became bearish about market prospects and ex-
pected a further fall. Since the brokerage ﬁrm restricts the ability
of its clients to sell stocks short to the 50 largest and most liquid
Dutch stocks and only allows intraday short selling, most investors
use options to speculate on a market decrease. Therefore, we ex-
pect that at the end of 2002 investors took bearish positions in
options.
Initial evidence supporting this hypothesis is provided in Fig. 2,
which plots the return on the MSCI Netherlands equity index, the
gross return difference between equity investors and option trad-
ers, and the ratio of short-term (3 months to expiration or less) op-
tion positions taken in anticipation of a market increase and
positions taken in anticipation of a market decrease. We calculate
this call/put ratio as the value of call options bought by the inves-
tors divided by the value of their put option purchases.
10 An in-
crease (decrease) in the call/put ratio indicates that option
investors become more optimistic (pessimistic) about stock market
prospects. Fig. 2 indicates that the ratio is below one for most
months in 2003 and 2004, which is exactly the period in which stock
markets started to recover. This supports our hypothesis that, after
the stock market crash in 2001 and 2002, option traders speculated
on a further decline of the market. As a result, they missed part of the
recovery of the market and consequently, common stock investors
outperformed option traders during this period.
The importance of sentiment in option markets has recently
been shown by Han (2008), who documents that investor senti-
ment about the stock market affects option prices. Fig. 3 relates
the call/put ratio to the level of the MSCI Netherlands index and
Table 3
Investor performance and characteristics.
Raw return Alpha
Gross Net Gross Net
Full Sub 1 Sub 2 Full Sub 1 Sub 2 Full Sub 1 Sub 2 Full Sub 1 Sub 2
Options  1.34 0.40  3.23  3.38  1.39  5.55  1.11 0.39  1.96  3.21  1.54  4.32
( 1.88) (0.37) ( 3.95) ( 4.73) ( 1.28) ( 7.10) ( 2.08) (0.41) ( 2.77) ( 6.09) ( 1.58) ( 6.68)
Stocks & options  0.91  1.10  0.70  1.64  1.77  1.50  0.79  0.69  0.64  1.53  1.39  1.42
( 3.96) ( 3.09) ( 2.47) ( 7.04) ( 5.01) ( 4.97) ( 3.61) ( 1.69) ( 2.25) ( 6.91) ( 3.45) ( 4.92)
Turnover 0.67 0.84 0.47  0.08 0.08  0.27 0.79 1.38 0.29 0.04 0.54  0.42
(4.54) (3.34) (3.57) ( 0.63) (0.36) ( 2.20) (5.72) (5.05) (2.10) (0.28) (1.16) ( 2.96)
Inactive  1.16  0.92  1.42 0.79 1.05 0.52  1.46  2.07  0.27 0.52  0.02 1.64
( 2.83) ( 1.57) ( 2.47) (2.03) (1.87) (0.95) ( 4.26) ( 3.42) ( 0.57) (1.60) ( 0.03) (3.60)
Single woman 0.38 0.67 0.07 0.37 0.66 0.06 0.33 0.36 0.19 0.31 0.34 0.16
(3.47) (3.96) (0.60) (3.35) (3.96) (0.45) (3.52) (2.12) (1.52) (3.32) (2.06) (1.28)
Joint 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.23 0.25 0.20 0.13  0.02 0.14 0.18 0.04 0.17
(3.44) (2.12) (3.53) (4.44) (2.83) (4.39) (2.29) ( 0.21) (3.89) (3.75) (0.42) (2.76)
Portfolio value 0.28 0.38 0.17 0.55 0.66 0.44 0.22 0.02 0.23 0.50 0.31 0.41
(2.52) (2.03) (1.96) (5.21) (3.48) (5.35) (2.01) (0.07) (2.45) (5.07) (1.48) (3.97)
Age/10  0.01 0.01  0.03  0.02 0.01  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.07  0.06  0.07
( 0.28) (0.22) ( 1.03) ( 0.59) (0.23) ( 1.78) ( 2.32) ( 1.39) ( 2.04) ( 2.78) ( 1.14) ( 2.19)
Income 0.47 0.73 0.19 0.50 0.77 0.21 0.43 0.84 0.35 0.46 0.89 0.37
(5.16) (5.42) (1.80) (5.55) (5.81) (2.03) (3.54) (4.09) (5.25) (4.87) (5.67) (3.50)
Experience 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.02 0.11 0.38 0.02 0.05 0.16 0.03
(1.09) (0.95) (0.42) (1.09) (0.92) (0.43) (1.04) (1.23) (0.79) (0.84) (1.11) (0.20)
This table reports Fama–MacBeth (1973) coefﬁcient estimates. The left-hand side of the table uses raw returns as dependent variables and the right-hand side refers to alphas.
Both gross and net returns are used in the estimation. We estimate the Fama–MacBeth regressions for the full period, January 2000 to March 2006, and for two subperiods,
January 2000 to March 2003 and April 2003 to March 2006. The independent variables are investor characteristics. Options is a dummy variable equal to one if an investor
only traded options in a given month. Stocks&options is a dummy variable equal to one if the investor trades both stocks and options in a particular month. Turnover is the
average of the value of all purchases and sales of an investor in a given month divided by beginning-of-the-month account value. Inactive is a dummy variable equal to one if
an investor does not trade in a given month. Single woman and joint are dummy variables equal to one if the account is held by a woman or jointly by a man and woman,
respectively. Portfolio value is the market value of all assets in the investor’s portfolio and is lagged by one month. Age is the age of the primary account holder. Income is the
monthly income assigned to investors based on their zip-code. Experience is the number of months the investor has been trading. Turnover and portfolio value are expressed
as natural logarithms. t-Statistics are in parentheses.
10 We also considered an extension of this ratio, deﬁned as the sum of the value of
call options bought and put options sold divided by the sum of the value of put
options bought and call options sold. Using this ratio leads to similar results.
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Fig. 3. MSCI Netherlands index and sentiment measures. This ﬁgure shows the evolution through time of the MSCI Netherlands Equity Index, scaled to 1 in January 2000, and
of three sentiment measures. We deﬁne the call/put ratio as the value of short-term (3 months to expiration or less) call options bought by the investors divided by the value
of their put option purchases. The AEX VIX index captures the implied volatility embedded in prices of options on the Dutch AEX stock market index. We plot the inverse of
the VIX so that low values correspond to fear among investors. The Consumer Conﬁdence Index is constructed by the investors divided by the value of their put option
purchases. The AEX VIX index captures the implied volatility embedded in prices of options on the Dutch AEX stock market index. We plot the inverse of the VIX so that low
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Gross Return Difference Equity Traders and Option Traders (%)
MSCI Netherlands Return (%)
Fig. 2. Call/put ratio and return difference equity traders and option traders. This ﬁgure plots the evolution through time of the monthly call/put ratio, the return on the MSCI
Netherlands equity index and the gross return difference between equity and option traders. We calculate the call/put ratio as the value of short-term (3 months to expiration
or less) call options bought by the investors divided by the value of their put option purchases. The sample period is January 2000 to March 2006.
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dence index obtained from the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics
and the AEX volatility index (VIX) provided by Euronext. The VIX
measures the market expectations of short term volatility implied
by AEX index option prices. Since volatility often signals ﬁnancial
turmoil, the VIX is commonly interpreted as a measure of fear in
the market.
11 We plot the inverse of the VIX so that high values cor-
respond to optimism among investors. Fig. 3 shows a strong relation
between the MSCI index on the one hand and the three sentiment
measures on the other hand. Both the index and the sentiment
indicators reach their lowest value in the beginning of 2003, which
coincides with the start of the second subperiod. The plots also re-
veal that after the downfall of the market it takes considerable time
before conﬁdence of consumers and investors has been restored to
normal levels.
Table 4 provides a more formal analysis of the relation between
sentiment, market timing, and investor performance. The pairwise
correlations between the three different sentiment measures re-
ported in panel A conﬁrm their strong relationships depicted in
Fig. 3. In panel B we present results for time-series regressions of
the gross return difference between option traders and equity
investors on the market return, the call/put ratio, and interaction
terms between these two variables. The ﬁrst column shows that
the market return alone explains more than 37% of the perfor-
mance difference between these two groups of investors. The neg-
ative coefﬁcient implies that option traders lose relative to stock
investors when markets increase, which lends further support to
the hypothesis that bad market timing is responsible for the under-
performance of option traders in the second subperiod, when stock
markets rose. The second column indicates that adding the call/put
ratio only leads to a small increase in the adjusted R
2. In contrast,
column 3 shows that adding an interaction term between the mar-
ket return and the call/put ratio leads to a sharp increase in explan-
atory power. In fact, this two-factor model explains more than 60%
of the underperformance of option traders. The positive coefﬁcient
on this interaction term means that for a given market return, an
increase in the call/put ratio is related to an increase in the relative
performance of option traders. This explains the poor performance
of option investors in the second subperiod, when the call/put ratio
of their trades was low.
In columns four and ﬁve we include call/put ratios constructed
using index options and stock options, respectively, to examine
whether the underperformance of option traders is driven by mar-
ket sentiment (index options) or stock-speciﬁc sentiment (stock
options). When including these variables separately, they are both
signiﬁcant at a 1% level. In column six we include both ratios
simultaneously in the regression and ﬁnd that they are still signif-
icant. This suggests that market sentiment and stock-speciﬁc sen-
timent are both important in explaining the underperformance of
option traders.
The conclusion that option traders overreact to past stock mar-
ket movements is in line with results of Lakonishok et al. (2007).
These authors ﬁnd that discount clients decreased their open inter-
est in purchased puts at the height of the Internet bubble but shar-
ply cut their bets that prices would increase after the burst of the
bubble. In contrast, clients of full-service brokers and ﬁrm proprie-
tary traders did not use the option market to speculate on rising
prices during the boom.
To further investigate the relation between sentiment and mar-
ket returns, we estimate vector autoregressive (VAR) models with
the call/put ratio and the market return as dependent variables.
The VAR model makes it possible to examine the dynamic interre-
lationships between sentiment and market returns. The methodol-
ogy is similar to that used by Brown and Cliff (2004) and Schmitz
et al. (2007), who ﬁnd strong evidence that sentiment is driven
by past stock market returns but little evidence that sentiment pre-
dicts returns.
The general VAR model is given by
Yt ¼ /0 þ
X P
j¼1
/jYt j þgt; ð9Þ
where Yt is a vector that contains the call/put ratio and the market
return. We use the Schwarz criterion and the Akaike information
criterion to determine the appropriate number of lags P. These cri-
Table 4
Sentiment and market timing.
Mean Std. dev. Autocorrelation Pairwise correlations
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on sentiment indicators
Call/put ratio 1.12 0.49 0.79 1
AEX VIX index 24.63 10.77 0.86  0.60 1
CC index  13.45 19.74 0.97 0.43  0.52 1
Gross return difference option traders and equity traders
Panel B: Option trader performance and market timing
Intercept  1.91  4.48  1.99  1.82  1.97  1.90
( 3.08) ( 2.95) ( 4.16) ( 3.67) ( 4.00) ( 4.01)
Market  0.77  0.78  2.14  3.29  2.35  3.15





Market call/put index 3.14 1.79
(6.45) (2.70)
Market call/put stocks 0.66 0.40
(6.55) (2.87)
Adj. R
2 (%) 37.1 38.3 61.8 59.0 59.5 62.8
Panel A of this table presents descriptive statistics for three sentiment indicators. We deﬁne the call/put ratio as the value of all call options bought by the investors divided by
the value of their put option purchases. The AEX VIX index captures the implied volatility embedded in prices of options on the Dutch AEX stock market index. The CC index is
the consumer conﬁdence index constructed by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). Panel B presents results for time-series regressions of the gross return difference
between option traders and equity traders on the market return, the call/put ratio, and various interaction terms between the market return and the call/put ratio,
constructed using index options, stock options, or both. t-Statistics based on Newey–West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are in parentheses.
11 The construction of the AEX volatility index follows the current methodology of
the CBOE for constructing the traditional VIX, which is based on the S&P500 index
option prices listed on CBOE.
740 R. Bauer et al./Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (2009) 731–746teria prefer a speciﬁcation with two lags of the call/put ratio and the
market return.
Table 5 presents the estimation results from the VAR model
for the full sample period and the two subperiods. The ﬁrst col-
umn shows that the ﬁrst-order lags of the call/put ratio and the
market return have a signiﬁcantly positive impact on the current
level of the call/put ratio. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that option investors extrapolate recent market returns. In con-
trast, Schmitz et al. (2007) derive a sentiment measure from war-
rants and ﬁnd that past returns have a negative impact on
sentiment, while sentiment has a positive impact on future re-
turns. However, these effects are short-lived (2 days), so senti-
ment measures do not seem to be useful to predict returns for
longer horizons. Table 5 also reports F-statistics and p-values
for Granger causality tests that the coefﬁcients on the lags of
the independent variables other than the lags of the dependent
variable are jointly equal to zero. The results show that market
returns Granger-cause the call/put ratio at the 1% level. In con-
trast, column two indicates that lags of the call/put ratio do
not predict the return on the market. Estimation results for the
two subperiods are similar and conﬁrm the conclusion that sen-
timent among option investors, as measured by the call/put ratio,
Table 6
Trading behavior and investor characteristics.
Probit Fama–MacBeth Panel
Options Stocks Options Stocks Options Stocks
Intercept  1.51  1.09  2.40 0.20  3.12 0.02
( 10.63) ( 5.19) ( 6.14) (0.91) ( 4.56) (0.06)
Net returnt 1  0.33 0.06  0.81 0.02  0.76 0.04
( 4.80) (1.14) ( 10.06) (0.52) ( 7.15) (0.68)
Single woman  0.20  0.23  0.33  0.21  0.40  0.25
( 9.15) ( 7.56) ( 8.79) ( 11.26) ( 6.34) ( 8.02)
Joint  0.13  0.07  0.22  0.06  0.26  0.07
( 10.00) ( 3.61) ( 11.11) ( 8.34) ( 6.99) ( 5.39)
Portfolio value 0.16 0.23 0.35 0.25 0.38 0.27
(38.35) (20.58) (14.56) (14.64) (8.86) (10.86)
Age/10 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.02
(7.57) (0.22) (12.02) (6.84) (8.48) (4.98)
Income  0.12  0.17  0.29  0.25  0.30  0.26
( 6.49) ( 7.09) ( 16.23) ( 27.27) ( 7.86) ( 11.42)
Experience/12  0.08  0.01  0.25  0.17  0.17  0.12
( 14.17) ( 5.72) ( 7.12) ( 4.17) ( 7.42) ( 9.44)
Inverse Mills ratio 2.13 0.79 2.46 0.97
(10.99) (8.87) (7.12) (6.63)
Equity trades 0.22 0.48 0.53
(30.35) (16.12) (9.13)
Option trades 0.23 0.18 0.20
(9.03) (11.72) (15.13)
R
2 (%) 6.6 9.2 6.3 6.9 4.3 5.6
This table relates the trading behavior of individual investors to investor characteristics. Results in the columns labeled ‘‘Probit” are estimates for a pooled probit regression
with standard errors clustered by investor and month to account for potential serial correlation and cross-correlation in parentheses. Results in the columns labeled ‘‘Fama–
MacBeth” refer to Fama and MacBeth (1973) coefﬁcient estimates with Newey–West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors in parentheses. Results in
the columns labeled ‘‘Panel” are pooled OLS panel regression estimates with standard errors clustered by investor and month in parentheses. The dependent variable in the
probit model is a dummy variable equal to one if an investor trades options (column 1) or stocks (column 2) in a given month. The dependent variable in the Fama–MacBeth
and panel regressions is the logarithm of the number of option trades per month per account (columns 3 and 5) or the logarithm of the number of equity trades (columns 4
and 6). The inverse Mills ratio is based on the estimates of the pooled probit regressions and is included to account for self-selection in trading decisions. The R
2 for the probit
regressions is the pseudo R
2.
Table 5
VAR model of sentiment and market returns.
2000/01–2006/03 2000/01–2003/03 2003/04–2006/03
Call/put Market Call/put Market Call/put Market
Intercept 0.26 0.89 0.29  3.58 0.18 2.02
(3.71) (0.55) (2.28) ( 1.29) (1.41) (0.80)
Call/putt 1 0.63 1.10 0.67 2.98 0.45  0.26
(6.13) (0.47) (4.60) (0.95) (2.64) ( 0.08)
Call/putt 2 0.11  2.03 0.05  1.92 0.35 0.68
(1.15) ( 0.91) (0.40) ( 0.64) (2.10) (0.21)
Markett 1 0.02 0.06 0.02  0.06 0.02  0.21
(3.09) (0.53) (1.96) ( 0.36) (2.48) ( 1.25)
Markett 2  0.01 0.10  0.01  0.02 0.00  0.14
( 0.84) (0.81) ( 0.62) ( 0.09) (0.35) ( 0.80)
Granger causality F 5.08 0.53 2.28 0.48 3.09 0.03
P-value (0.01) (0.59) (0.12) (0.62) (0.06) (0.97)
Adj. R
2 (%) 70.3  2.4 70.5  9.1 54.7  5.2
This table presents estimation results for vector autoregressive models with two lags. The dependent variables are the call/put ratio and the market return. We estimate the
VAR models for the full period, January 2000 to March 2006, and for two subperiods, January 2000 to March 2003 and April 2003 to March 2006. t-Statistics based on Newey–
West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are in parentheses. Granger causality F is the F-statistic of a test that the coefﬁcients on the lags of the
independent variables other than the lags of the dependent variable are jointly equal to zero.
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does not predict future market returns.
4.3. Hedging and gambling motivations for option trading
The large losses on option investments bring up the question
why individual investors trade options. In this section we consider
two alternative motivations for option trading. First, it is possible
that investors use options for hedging the downward risk of their
stock portfolio. Another possibility is that investors use options
for gambling. Kumar (2008) links the preference of individual
investors for lottery stocks to their socioeconomic characteristics.
He deﬁnes lottery stocks as stocks with a low price, high idiosyn-
cratic skewness, and high idiosyncratic volatility and shows that
state lotteries and lottery stocks attract a similar socioeconomic
clientele, which consists of poor, young, single men. However, op-
tions seem to be even more attractive for gambling purposes than
stocks because of the leverage they provide and their skewed
payoffs.
We examine this hypothesis by linking both option trading and
equity trading to a number of investor and portfolio characteristics.
Speciﬁcally, we regress different measures of trading on a gender
dummy variable, lagged portfolio value, age, income, experience,
and past portfolio returns. We also include the number of trades
in the other asset class as a regressor to control for an investor’s
general propensity to trade. Furthermore, this allows us to investi-
gate whether option investors also trade more stocks than equity-
only investors.
The ﬁrst two columns in Table 6 report estimates for a pooled
probit model that measures the inﬂuence of the investor and port-
folio characteristics on the decision to trade options (column one)
and stocks (column two) in a given month. Standard errors are
clustered by investor and by time period, as suggested by Petersen
(in press), to account for both serial correlation and cross-sectional
correlation. The results indicate that past portfolio returns have a
signiﬁcantly negative impact on the decision to trade options. In
contrast, past returns have a positive but insigniﬁcant effect on
the decision to trade stocks. The ﬁnding that lower past returns in-
crease trading activity among option investors but decrease the
intensity of trading among equity investors is consistent with a
disposition effect being present among equity traders but absent
among option traders. Another potential explanation for this ﬁnd-
ing is that option traders are loss-averse and take more risk follow-
ing losses and less risk following gains. This is consistent with
evidence documented by Coval and Shumway (2005), who show
that professional future traders are highly loss averse.
Table 6 also shows that females have a lower propensity to
trade both options and stocks, which generalizes the conclusion
of Barber and Odean (2001) that men trade more than women to
the option market. Portfolio value has a positive impact on the
decision to trade, since large portfolios require more trades. We
further ﬁnd that older investors are more likely to trade stocks
and options. A possible explanation for this result is that for older
investors trading is a leisure activity.
12 Experience and income low-
er the probability of trading stocks and options, consistent with the
view that less experienced investors and those with lower income
are more inclined to gamble.
The probit regressions consider the decision to trade but not
the intensity of trading. Therefore, in columns three and four
we report Fama–MacBeth regression estimates in which the
dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of option
trades (column three) and equity trades (column four). Since
the dependent variables exhibit serial correlation, we correct the
Fama–MacBeth standard errors for serial correlation using the
Newey–West procedure, as suggested by Cochrane (2005).I n
addition, we apply the Heckman (1976) two-stage procedure to
account for self-selection in the trading decision. In the ﬁrst
stage, we use the estimates from the probit regressions to calcu-
late the inverse Mills ratio. We then include the inverse Mills
ratio as an additional regressor in the Fama–MacBeth regressions
to obtain consistent estimates.
The Fama–MacBeth estimates are qualitatively similar to the
results from the probit model. In particular, higher portfolio re-
turns in the previous month decrease option trading activity
but increase the intensity of equity trading. Single men, investors
with large accounts, older investors, and those with low income
and little experience tend to trade most. Furthermore, the results
conﬁrm the hypothesis that investors who trade more options
(stocks) also trade more stocks (options). Although we correct
the Fama–MacBeth standard errors for serial correlation, as a
robustness check we also report estimation results for pooled pa-
nel regressions in the last two columns with standard errors
clustered by investor and by time period. The results from the
panel model are very similar to the Fama–MacBeth estimates
and conﬁrm the conclusion that investor and portfolio character-
istics have the same inﬂuence on option trading as on equity
trading, except for the impact of past portfolio returns. The ﬁnd-
ing that single men with low income and little experience trade
most suggests that gambling and entertainment play an impor-
tant role in explaining excessive trading by individual investors
in both option and stock markets.
To dig further into the motivations for trading options, in Table 7
we classify all opening option trades into purchased call, written
call, purchased put, and written put positions. Furthermore, a split
is made between AEX index options and stock options. Panel A re-
ports the percentage of option volume in a given category relative
to the total of calls and puts traded. When looking at trading vol-
ume in all options, purchased call options dominate, followed by
written calls, written puts and purchased put positions. The result
that call positions are more prevalent than put positions is consis-
tent with results documented by Lakonishok et al. (2007). How-
ever, differentiating between index options and stock options
shows that purchased put positions dominate for index options
but are least prevalent for stock options. Similarly, Schmitz et
al. (2007) ﬁnd that for index warrants, trading volume of calls
equals volume of puts but that for stock warrants, volume of calls
is much larger than volume of puts. The ﬁnding that purchased
puts are the least frequently traded category of stock options sug-
gests that most investors do not use options for hedging their
underlying stock portfolio. Panel B shows the percentage of the
value of option trades in a given category relative to the total va-
lue of calls and puts traded. These results are qualitatively similar
to those reported in panel A. In particular, most investments in in-
dex options are purchased put positions while for stock options
the highest amount of money is invested in long call positions.
In Panel C we display the moneyness of the options in each cat-
egory, deﬁned as the strike price divided by the price of the under-
lying asset. The results indicate that investors have a strong
preference for out-of-the-money options. This holds for both calls
and puts and for index options and stock options. The tendency
to take out-of-the-money option positions is consistent with a
gambling motive for option trading, since these options are cheap
and offer a small probability of a large gain, similar to a lottery
ticket.
Panel D reports the percentage of stock options for which the
investor holds the underlying stock. These results provide direct
evidence that most investors do not use options for hedging. In
fact, more than 70% of all purchased puts are naked positions.
12 Another reason could be that their risk aversion is lower because they tend to
have more wealth. We thank the referee for pointing this out.
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which the investor has a long position in the underlying stock is
that of written calls, which suggests that some investors use a
strategy of covered call writing. Although written calls can be used
for hedging, the protection they provide against a price decline of
the underlying asset is limited to the option premium. Given the
restrictions imposed by the broker on short-selling stocks, it is un-
likely that investors use purchased call and written put positions
for hedging short-stock positions. Panel D indeed shows that most
positions taken in these categories are also naked positions. Our
conclusion that most individual investors primarily use options
for speculation reinforces results documented by Lakonishok et
al. (2007) for the US market.
We use survey data to complement the information derived
from the trades and portfolio positions of the investors. In Septem-
ber 2005, a questionnaire was sent to all clients of the brokerage
ﬁrm. In total 4516 clients responded, which we split into 2323
option traders and 2193 equity-only traders. Panel A in Table 8
reports the responses to statements related to investor experience
and to the importance of the portfolio held at the online broker. An
important difference between option traders and equity investors
is that only a small proportion of option traders consider them-
selves novice investors while more than half of all equity traders
think they are novice investors. However, the average option inves-
tor indicates that she has been trading for just 4 years, which is
only slightly longer than the investment experience of equity trad-
ers. This suggests that option traders are overconﬁdent about their
investment experience and skills. Panel A further shows that both
option and equity traders indicate that they invest more than half
of their portfolio at the broker. This implies that the losses inves-
tors incur on accounts held at the broker can have a serious impact
on their total ﬁnancial wealth.
Panel B shows the responses to statements that measure the
investment attitude of the clients. More than half of all option trad-
ers indicate that investing is just a hobby for them. Consistent with
this result, over 80% of the option investors and 65% of the equity
traders state that they only invest the money they have left. More-
over, whereas 17.2% of the option traders agree to the statement
that short-term speculation is their main investment objective
only 9.4% of the equity investors agree. The overall picture that
emerges from the results reported in panel B is that for both groups
of investors entertainment and sensation-seeking are important
reasons for investing. However, option traders seem to be affected
most by these factors.
Panel C presents the responses to three statements on option
trading. As expected, only a small proportion of option investors
and a majority of equity traders consider option trading too risky.
A striking result is that only 10% of those who do invest in options
indicate that they use the option Greeks when trading options. This
ﬁnding suggests that a lack of knowledge about the risk and return
characteristics and the use of options might also contribute to the
poor performance on option investments. Finally, panel C reveals
that only 20% of the option traders indicate that they use options
primarily for hedging their risks, which conﬁrms the conclusion
from Table 7 that little option volume can be attributed to hedging.
4.4. Option trading skills
Although the previous sections have shown that on average op-
tion traders perform poorly, it is possible that some sophisticated
investors do possess trading skills and are able to exploit inefﬁ-
ciencies in the option market. Coval etal. (2005) present strong evi-
Table 8





Panel A: Investor experience (% agree or amount x)
‘‘I consider myself a novice investor” 18.2 50.7
‘‘I already invest for x years” 4.0 3.5
‘‘I invest x% of my portfolio at another bank or broker” 48.8 46.0
Panel B: Investment attitude (% agree)
‘‘Investing is just a hobby for me” 55.7 43.6
‘‘I only invest the money I have left” 80.9 65.3
‘‘My main investment objective is short-term speculation” 17.2 9.4
Panel C: Option trading (% agree)
‘‘Option trading is too risky” 11.6 67.8
‘‘When trading options I use the option Greeks” 11.2 –
‘‘I primarily use options to hedge my risks” 19.6 –
This table shows the responses of 4516 clients of the brokerage ﬁrm to statements
on investor experience (panel A), investment attitude (panel B), and option trading
(panel C). We split the respondents into 2323 option traders and 2193 equity
traders. The questionnaire was sent to clients in September 2005.
Table 7
Descriptive statistics on option positions.
Call Put
Purchased Written Total Purchased Written Total
Panel A: Option volume (%)
All 40.4 21.3 61.7 17.9 20.3 38.3
Index 30.3 17.4 47.6 33.1 19.2 52.4
Stock 45.2 23.2 68.4 10.8 20.8 31.6
Panel B: Option value (%)
All 34.4 16.9 51.3 28.1 20.6 48.7
Index 26.3 16.2 42.5 37.9 19.5 57.5
Stock 49.6 18.3 67.8 9.5 22.7 32.2
Panel C: Option moneyness (K/S)
All 1.02 1.03 1.02 0.97 0.94 0.96
Index 1.03 1.03 1.03 0.98 0.95 0.97
Stock 1.01 1.03 1.02 0.96 0.94 0.95
Panel D: Underlying stock holdings (%)
Yes 14.5 34.3 21.1 27.3 27.1 27.2
No 85.5 65.7 78.9 72.7 72.9 72.8
In this table we classify all 2,497,378 opening option trades into purchased call, written call, purchased put, and written put positions. Furthermore, a split is made between
index options (1,148,148 trades) and stock options (1,349,230 trades). Panel A reports the percentage of option volume in a given category relative to the total of calls and
puts traded. Panel B shows the percentage of the value of option trades in a given category relative to the total value of calls and puts traded. In Panel C we display the
moneyness of the options in each category, deﬁned as the strike price divided by the price of the underlying asset. Panel D reports the percentage of stock options for which
the investor holds the underlying stock.
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stock investors. They note that although it is unlikely that individ-
ual investors are better informed than professional fund managers,
they are better able to exploit superior information for two rea-
sons. First, individual investors usually trade smaller positions, so
the price impact of their trades is limited. Second, individual inves-
tors face fewer asset allocation constraints, since they are not re-
quired to hold a diversiﬁed portfolio or track a speciﬁed
benchmark. In this section we perform persistence tests to investi-
gate whether their ﬁndings can be extended to option traders. Sub-
sequently, we examine the characteristics and trading behavior of
successful and unsuccessful option investors.
We ﬁrst sort option traders into decile portfolios based on their
performance during a ranking period. We then calculate returns for
each of these deciles over an evaluation period. Repeating the
ranking procedure using nonoverlapping intervals produces a time
series of post-ranking returns for each decile. We include investors
who drop out of the sample during the evaluation period in the
portfolios until they disappear, after which we readjust the portfo-
lio weights. We test whether past winners continue to outperform
past losers by performing a t-test on the return difference between
decile 1 (past winners) and decile 10 (past losers). We also calcu-
late Spearman rank correlation coefﬁcients between the formation
period ranking and the evaluation period ranking. The null hypoth-
esis of the Spearman test is that there is no relation between for-
mation and evaluation period ranking, i.e., no performance
persistence.
Table 9
Performance persistence of option traders.
Decile Gross Net Factor loadings Adj. R
2
Return Alpha Return Alpha RM SMB HML MOM ATMC ATMP IT
Winner 0.07 0.22  0.05 0.03 1.03 0.16 0.13 0.01  0.11  1.85  0.06 84.8
(0.08) (0.73) ( 0.07) (0.13) (11.35) (1.07) (1.27) (0.22) ( 0.15) ( 2.25) ( 1.31)
2 0.39 0.49  0.09 0.23 0.81 0.17 0.20  0.10  1.13 0.55 0.05 91.5
(0.51) (2.34) ( 0.12) (1.18) (13.52) (2.53) (4.59) ( 2.78) ( 2.60) (0.97) (1.01)
3  0.07 0.16 0.02 0.08 0.79 0.13  0.05  0.02  0.04  0.43 0.06 94.4
( 0.10) (0.90) (0.03) (0.37) (23.44) (4.29) ( 1.15) ( 0.99) ( 0.17) ( 1.44) (2.25)
4 0.28 0.44  0.12 0.03 0.97 0.38 0.14 0.05 0.80 0.32 0.21 95.2
(0.35) (1.82) ( 0.16) (0.14) (25.32) (9.81) (3.39) (1.49) (2.68) (0.05) (5.46)
5  0.08 0.09  0.44  0.30 1.19 0.47 0.10 0.03  1.29 0.82 0.19 94.0
( 0.09) (0.31) ( 0.45) ( 0.97) (17.56) (4.20) (1.18) (0.52) ( 3.22) (0.13) (3.75)
6  0.31 0.02  0.48  0.23 1.16 0.57  0.01 0.11 0.57  1.21 0.32 87.6
( 0.32) (0.08) ( 0.50) ( 0.79) (18.32) (3.72) ( 0.14) (1.53) (0.89) ( 1.82) (5.18)
7  0.42  0.13  0.87  0.77 1.25 0.90 0.15 0.25  0.76 1.71 0.39 87.2
( 0.44) ( 0.35) ( 0.84) ( 1.44) (19.22) (8.95) (1.50) (3.99) ( 1.40) (2.23) (6.61)
8  0.39  0.17  1.05  0.68 1.51 1.17 0.08 0.27 0.37 0.05 0.59 90.8
( 0.32) ( 0.34) ( 0.91) ( 1.14) (18.83) (12.35) (0.70) (3.99) (0.59) (0.05) (7.88)
9  1.64  1.37  2.30  2.23 1.34 0.91 0.17 0.24  0.19 0.19 0.64 79.4
( 1.33) ( 2.61) ( 1.77) ( 3.36) (12.29) (5.72) (1.06) (2.59) ( 0.25) (0.13) (5.62)
Loser  3.59  3.47  4.91  4.82 1.01 0.93 0.05 0.14 0.48  3.19 0.72 52.7
( 2.82) ( 5.13) ( 3.98) ( 7.82) (5.10) (3.15) (0.21) (1.14) (0.35) ( 1.45) (2.95)
Winner–loser 3.66 3.69 4.86 4.85 0.02  0.77 0.08  0.13  0.59 1.34  0.78 11.3






At the end of every year from 2000 to 2004 we sort option investors into equal-weighted decile portfolios based on returns earned over the year. Each portfolio is held for 1
year and subsequently rebalanced. This table shows the average monthly raw returns, alphas and factor loadings for each decile portfolio in the post-formation period. Decile
1 contains the 10% of investors with the highest return during the ranking period and decile 10 includes the worst 10% performers in the ranking period. Columns labeled
‘‘gross” (‘‘net”) refer to deciles formed and evaluated based on gross (net) returns. t-Statistics based on Newey–West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Rank correlation is the Spearman rank correlation coefﬁcient that measures the relation between formation period ranking and evaluation period
ranking. *** denotes its signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Table 10
Characteristics of successful and unsuccessful option traders.
Decile Value (€) Turnover (%) Men (%) Age (years) Income (€) Experience (months)
Winner 26,341 15.9 70.6 44.1 2706 41.2
2 25,604 5.9 64.5 46.9 2611 41.8
3 27,023 3.7 71.2 47.0 2714 42.0
4 18,853 5.3 67.1 49.5 2473 41.8
5 12,401 8.1 73.7 44.9 2552 41.7
6 14,001 8.7 76.3 54.1 2498 41.9
7 4261 9.6 84.1 42.1 2316 41.0
8 5382 8.4 83.0 46.8 2323 40.7
9 3235 16.0 84.6 45.3 2404 39.5
Loser 1813 76.7 85.1 48.1 2279 34.8
Winner–loser 23,106  60.8  14.5 4.0 427 6.4
This table reports time series averages of monthly cross-sectional averages of investor characteristics for decile portfolios of option investors formed on the basis of past 1-
year net return. As an exception, the numbers we report for account value and income are time series averages of monthly cross-sectional median values. Decile 1 contains
the 10% of investors with the highest return during the ranking period and decile 10 includes the worst 10% performers in the ranking period. Value is the market value of all
assets in the investor’s account. Turnover is the average value of purchases and sales in a given month divided by beginning-of-the-month account value. Men is the
percentage of accounts in a given decile portfolio held by a man and Age is the age of the primary account holder. Income is the monthly gross income assigned to investors
based on their zip-code. Experience is the number of months the investor has been trading.
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sistence in transaction costs, we perform the analysis using both
gross and net returns. If we only ﬁnd evidence of performance per-
sistence when we sort on net returns we conclude that it is related
to costs. We consider 3-, 6-, and 12-month ranking and evaluation
periods. This choice is based on mutual fund studies showing that
performance persistence is usually short term (e.g., Busse and Ir-
vine, 2006). Using longer periods also means that we can include
fewer investors in the analysis, because we require an investor to
be present in the sample during the complete ranking period and
at least 1 month in the evaluation period. On the other hand, re-
sults for periods shorter than 3 months are likely to be dominated
by noise and luck.
Table 9 presents post-formation returns and alphas for portfo-
lios of option investors sorted on past 1-year return. The columns
labeled ‘‘gross” (‘‘net”) refer to deciles formed and evaluated on the
basis of gross (net) performance. The results indicate that on aver-
age, option traders in the top decile continue to outperform those
in the bottom decile in the year subsequent to the formation year
by more than 3.5% per month in terms of gross return and almost
5% in terms of net return. The consistency in gross returns indicates
that persistence in costs explains only part of total performance
persistence. A substantial part of the performance differential is
driven by the extremely poor performance of the option investors
in decile 10. Gross and net returns for these investors are 2% and
2.5% lower, respectively, than for those in decile 9. The Spearman
rank correlation is signiﬁcant at the 1% level, which indicates a
strong relation between formation and evaluation period
ranking.
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The difference in performance between past winners and losers
also shows up when we consider risk- and style-adjusted returns.
Investors in decile 1 earn gross and net alphas that are almost 4%
and 5% higher, respectively, than those earned by investors in dec-
ile 10. These differences are signiﬁcant at a 1% level. Spearman
rank correlation coefﬁcients exceed 0.9 and are also signiﬁcant at
the 1% level, providing strong evidence of performance persistence
among option traders. Although gross and net alphas for option
investors in the top deciles are positive but insigniﬁcant, alphas
are signiﬁcantly negative for those in the bottom two deciles. Table
9 also reports the exposures of the returns on the decile portfolios
to the factors in the performance attribution model. Loser deciles
tend to have signiﬁcantly higher loadings on the SMB and IT factors
than winner deciles, indicating strong tilts in their portfolios to-
wards small tech stocks.
Since the performance difference between winners and losers
cannot be explained by risk and style tilts, we investigate whether
it can be linked to heterogeneity in the characteristics of investors
and their portfolios. Table 10 presents the characteristics of the
investors in the decile portfolios formed on past 1-year returns.
We ﬁnd that the median account value decreases uniformly with
ranking, i.e., the bottom decile consists of investors who hold the
smallest accounts. Furthermore, those in the bottom deciles have
much higher turnover than successful option traders. Table 10 also
shows that a higher proportion of accounts in the bottom deciles is
held by men with low income and little investment experience.
5. Conclusion
This paper shows that option trading has a detrimental impact
on the performance of individual investors. The losses investors in-
cur on their option investments are much larger than those from
equity trading. Risk and style tilts and differences in demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics do not explain the poor perfor-
mance of option traders relative to equity investors. Instead, we
attribute the poor performance of option traders to bad market
timing due to overreaction to past stock market movements. In
particular, after the collapse of the Internet bubble, option traders
speculated on a further market decrease when markets actually
started to recover. High trading costs also contribute to the losses
suffered by option investors.
We also show that various demographic, socioeconomic, and
portfolio characteristics that have been linked to gambling by Ku-
mar (2008) have a similar inﬂuence on the trading intensity of op-
tion investors and equity investors. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that single
men with low income and little investment experience are most
likely to engage in both option trading and equity trading. How-
ever, an important difference between option traders and equity
investors is that the trading activity of the former increases after
past losses while past performance has a positive, but insigniﬁcant
effect on the trading volume of equity investors. By linking option
trades to the common stock holdings of individual investors we
rule out hedging as an important motivation for trading options.
Instead, investors tend to take naked, out-of-the-money option
positions, suggesting a gambling motive for trading options. Op-
tions are particularly attractive for gambling because of the lever-
age they provide and their skewed payoffs, thereby resembling
lottery tickets. Responses of investors to statements on investment
attitude conﬁrm that entertainment and sensation-seeking are
important reasons for trading options.
Despite the poor performance of the average option trader, we
do identify a small group of investors who consistently manage
to outperform the others. Option traders who are in the top decile
portfolio based on past 1-year performance continue to outperform
investors in the bottom decile over the next year. We further show
that persistence in trading costs explains only part of total perfor-
mance persistence. The bottom deciles tend to consist of male
investors with little experience and low income who hold small ac-
counts with high turnover. These results suggest that most option
traders lose money due to excessive trading and a lack of knowl-
edge. We conclude that trading hurts investor performance and
that trading options hurts most.
Appendix A. Cross-sectional risk and style adjustment
In this appendix we show how to obtain an unbiased estimate
of the relation between alphas and characteristics without estimat-
ing ﬁrst-stage time series regressions for every investor. Each
month, we estimate a cross-sectional regression of returns on
investor characteristics. We then regress the vector of monthly
cross-sectional coefﬁcients clt for each of the l investor characteris-
tics on a constant and the time series of risk and style factor real-
izations Fkt,




To see that the intercept dl0 in this time series regression is an
unbiased estimate of the cross-sectional relation between alpha
and investor characteristic l, consider the following. Suppose that
portfolio returns are generated by the factor model
Rit ¼ ai þ
X K
k¼1
bikFkt þ it: ð11Þ
We are interested in the cross-sectional relation between ai and
Zilt, the value of characteristic l for investor i at time t. Denote the
true coefﬁcient vector of this relation between alphas and the
13 Results for the 3- and 6-month ranking and evaluation periods (not reported to
save space) show that persistence is still signiﬁcant on 6-month horizons but absent
for shorter periods. Spearman coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant at the 5% level for 6-month
periods but not signiﬁcant for 3-month periods.
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Therefore, as noted by Brennan et al. (1998), the intercept dl0
from the time series regression of the monthly cross-sectional
parameter estimates clt on the vector of factor realizations Ft is
an unbiased estimate of dl if the factor premia are serially uncorre-
lated. Intuitively, the time series regression (10) purges the cross-
sectional coefﬁcients of their factor dependent component. The
standard error of dl0 is the standard error of the purged estimator.






tb and measure the relation between factor loadings and
investor characteristics.
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